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ABSTRACT
Massive amounts of video data are ubiquitously generated in per-
sonal devices and dedicated video recording facilities. Analyzing
such data would be extremely beneficial in real world (e.g., urban
traffic analysis, pedestrian behavior analysis, video surveillance).
However, videos contain considerable sensitive information, such
as human faces, identities and activities. Most of the existing video
sanitization techniques simply obfuscate the video by detecting
and blurring the region of interests (e.g., faces, vehicle plates, loca-
tions and timestamps)without quantifying and bounding the privacy
leakage in the sanitization. In this paper, to the best of our knowl-
edge, we propose the first differentially private video analytics
platform (VideoDP) which flexibly supports different video analyses
with rigorous privacy guarantee. Different from traditional noise-
injection based differentially private mechanisms, given the input
video, VideoDP randomly generates a utility-driven private video
in which adding or removing any sensitive visual element (e.g.,
human, object) does not significantly affect the output video. Then,
different video analyses requested by untrusted video analysts can
be flexibly performed over the utility-driven video while ensur-
ing differential privacy. Finally, we conduct experiments on real
videos, and the experimental results demonstrate that our VideoDP
effectively functions video analytics with good utility.
1 INTRODUCTION
Massive amounts of video data are ubiquitously generated everyday
from many different sources such as personal cameras and smart
phones, traffic monitoring and video surveillance facilities, and
many other video recording devices. Analyzing such complex, un-
structured and voluminous data [47] would be extremely beneficial
in real world (e.g., video surveillance). For instance, traffic monitor-
ing videos can be analyzed by traffic authorities, urban planning
officials, and some researchers [6] for learning urban traffic and
pedestrian behavior. Videos recorded by surveillance devices (gen-
erally involving numerous persons) might be analyzed for detecting
anomalies or suspicious behavior.
However, directly releasing videos to the analysts would result in
severe privacy concerns due to the sensitive information involved
in videos, such as human faces, objects, identities and activities [1].
For instance, traffic monitoring cameras can capture all the vehicles
which may involve the make, model and color of vehicles, moving
speed and trajectories, and even the drivers’ faces. To this end,
video sanitization (e.g., traffic monitoring videos [6], surveillance
videos [45], YouTube videos [4]) have been recently studied. Most
of such techniques (including the YouTube Blurring application
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[4]) obfuscate the video by detecting and then directly blurring the
region of interests, e.g., faces, vehicle plates, and locations [27, 45].
However, privacy leakage in the sanitized videos cannot be bounded
with a rigorous privacy notion. Then, video owners or individuals
cannot be provided with quantified privacy risks. Without rigorous
privacy guarantee, the blurred regions might be reconstructed by
deep learning methods [35, 40].
To address such deficiency, we propose a novel platform (namely,
VideoDP) that ensures differential privacy [18] for any video anal-
ysis requested from untrusted data analysts, including queries or
query-based analyses over the input video. Notice that, as the state-
of-the-art privacy model, differential privacy (DP) [18] can ensure
indistinguishable analysis result for inputs with and without any
one record (protecting any record against arbitrary background
knowledge). In VideoDP, we define a novel differential privacy no-
tion that adding or removing any sensitive visual element (e.g.,
human, object) into the input video does not significantly affect
the analysis result. Thus, the privacy risks can be strictly bounded
even if the adversaries possess arbitrary background knowledge
(e.g., knowing the objects or humans in the input video). To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first work proposed to provide
differentially private video analysis. Specifically, in VideoDP, we
address the following unique challenges (different from the exist-
ing differentially private schemes applied to other datasets, e.g.,
[13, 18, 26, 31, 41, 43]). Specifically,
Differential Privacy. Most other datasets (e.g., statistical data
[18], location data [41], search logs [31], social graphs [43]) have
explicit attribution of privacy concerns w.r.t. different individuals.
The differential privacy is defined as “adding or removing any
individual’s data does not result in significant privacy leakage”.
In the context of videos, as mentioned earlier, we consider the
“appearance of sensitive objects or humans” as the root cause of
privacy leakage in videos, and then seek for the protection that
the untrusted analyst cannot distinguish if any sensitive object or
human is included in the video or not, even if the adversaries have
arbitrary background knowledge about the objects/humans. Then,
we first address the challenge on accurately detecting and tagging
all the objects/humans in any video (by utilizing state-of-the-art
computer vision techniques [50, 51]). For instance, given a video
recorded on the street, our objective is to protect sensitive objects
(e.g., vehicles) and/or humans (e.g., pedestrians) by the DP scheme.
Utility-driven Private Video. Given any input video, different
from traditional differentially private mechanisms (e.g., injecting
noise into queries/analyses), we propose a novel randomization
scheme (via pixel sampling) to generate a utility-driven private
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video while ensuring the defined differential privacy notion. Specif-
ically, our VideoDP involves three phases. The first phase (differ-
entially private pixel sampling) randomly generates pixels for the
output video based on the visual elements and background scene in
the input video. Since videos are extremely large scale and highly-
dimensional at the pixel level (generally consisting ofmillions of pix-
els with very diverse RGBs [7]), it is extremely challenging to ensure
good utility for video via pixel sampling (e.g., many RGBs/pixels
cannot be sampled).
To further improve the output utility, after executing pixel sam-
pling in VideoDP, the second phase generates the (random) utility-
driven private video by interpolating the RGB values of unsampled
pixels and integrates such “estimated pixels” into the missing pixels.
Note that the pixel interpolation also satisfies differential privacy
with indistinguishability.
Universal VideoAnalytics Platform. In the first two phases, our
VideoDP generates the (probabilistic) utility-driven private video
which ensures indistinguishability regardless of adding or removing
any sensitive visual element in the input video. Therefore, in the
third phase, different video analyses requested by untrusted data
analysts (e.g., queries over the video for analytics) can be flexibly
performed over the utility-driven private video, as analyzed in
Section 4.2. VideoDP significantly outperforms the PINQ platform
[36] in the context of video analytics (e.g., reduced perturbation,
flexiblity for different video analyses), as discussed in Section 2.3
and validated in the experiments (Section 6).
Contributions.Motivated by first exploring rigorous privacy guar-
antee in videos, the major contributions of this paper are summa-
rized as below:
• We define the first differential privacy notion with respect
to protecting all the sensitive visual elements in any video.
• We propose a novel platform VideoDP which can flexibly
perform any video analysis requested by the video analyst
with differential privacy guarantee.
• VideoDP randomly generates a utility-driven private video
by sampling pixels (Phase I) with differential privacy and
interpolating unsampled pixels (Phase II) to boost the utility
for video analytics. Then, it enables universal private video
analyses (Phase III) with untrusted analysts.
• We have conducted extensive experiments to validate the
performance of VideoDP on real videos.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces some preliminaries. Section 3 illustrates the first phase
of VideoDP and analyzes the privacy guarantee. Section 4 presents
the second phase and third phase (private video analytics) as well as
the differential privacy guarantee. Section 5 discusses some relevant
aspects of VideoDP. Section 6 demonstrates the experimental results.
Section 7 and 8 present the literature and conclusions.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present some preliminaries for our VideoDP.
Since the differential privacy notion defined in VideoDP protects
all the sensitive objects and humans in the videos, for simplicity of
notations, we use “VE” to represent both objects and humans (viz.
visual elements) such as vehicles and pedestrians in this paper.
2.1 Video Features and Notations
Any video streamlines a sequence of frames, each of which includes
a fixed number of pixels. Referring to the RGB color model [7], video
data includes frame ID, 2-D coordinates, red, green, blue.1 Specifically,
we denote any pixel’s frame ID as t , its coordinates as (a,b), and
its RGB as a 3-dimensional vector θ (a,b, t) ∈ [0, 255]3 (16,581,375
distinct RGBs in the universe).
VEDetection. The state-of-the-art computer vision algorithms can
be utilized to accurately detect VEs (e.g., objects [23] and humans
[14]) in videos. In VideoDP, all the VEs in a video (denoted as ϒj , j ∈
[1,n]) are detected using the tracking algorithm [50, 51] in which
the same human/object in different frames is assigned the same
unique identifier (see Section 6 for details). Since the computer
vision algorithms [50, 51] achieve a very high detection accuracy,
we assume that the undetected visual elements do not result in
privacy leakage w.r.t. individuals in this paper.
Notice that the same visual element ϒj may have different size
and different RGB values (e.g., as a vehicle moves close to the
camera, its size visually grows). Thus, we should investigate all the
RGBs of every VE involved in all the frames. To break down the
video into pixels with RGBs, we denote the set of distinct RGBs
in VE ϒj (in all the frames) as Ψj where the cardinality is written
as |Ψj | (the number of distinct RGBs in ϒj ). Table 2 in Appendix E
shows the notations for video features in this paper.
2.2 Privacy Model
To protect sensitive objects or humans (“VE”) in the video, we first
consider two input videosV andV ′ that differ in any visual element
ϒ (in all the frames) as two neighboring inputs. Specifically, given
a video V , after completely removing ϒ in all the frames of V , we
can obtain V ′ (or vice-versa). Note that V and V ′ have identical
number of frames and background scene.
Then, VideoDP ensures that adding any VE into any number
of frames in a video or completely removing any VE from the
video would not result in significant privacy risks in video analyt-
ics, assuming that the adversary possesses arbitrary background
knowledge on all the VEs. W.l.o.g., denoting V = V ′ ∪ ϒ, we have:
Definition 2.1 (ϵ-Differential Privacy). A randomization algo-
rithmA satisfies ϵ-differential privacy if for any two input videosV
andV ′ that differ in any visual element (e.g., object or human) ϒ, and
for any output O ∈ ranдe(A), we have e−ϵ ≤ Pr [A(V )=O ]Pr [A(V ′)=O ] ≤ eϵ .
Furthermore, in two neighboring videosV andV ′, if there exists
a possible output O ∈ ranдe(A) that makes any of Pr [A(V ) = O]
and Pr [A(V ′) = O] equal to 0. For instance, since the extra visual
element ϒ is included in V but not in V ′, if an output O involves
elements from ϒ but cannot be generated from V ′ (simply due to
ϒ ∩V ′ = ∅). At this time, for such output O , we have Pr [A(V ) =
O] > 0 while Pr [A(V ′) = O] = 0.
In such cases, the multiplicative difference between Pr [A(V )=O ]Pr [A(V ′)=O ]
and Pr [A(V
′)=O ]
Pr [A(V )=O ] cannot be bounded by e
ϵ (due to the zero denom-
inator). To accommodate this, a relaxed privacy notion [24, 34] can
be defined:
1We focus on the privacy leakage resulted from the visual elements rather than audio.
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Figure 1: VideoDP Framework (ϵ-differential privacy for Phase I–III)
Definition 2.2 ((ϵ,δ )-Differential Privacy [24, 34]). A randomiza-
tion algorithm A satisfies (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy if for all video
V , we can divide the output space ranдe(A) into two sets Ω1,Ω2
such that (1) Pr [A(V ) ∈ Ω1] ≤ δ , and (2) for any ofV ’s neighboring
video V ′ and for all O ∈ Ω2: (2) e−ϵ ≤ Pr [A(V )=O ]Pr [A(V ′)=O ] ≤ eϵ .
This definition guarantees that algorithmA achieves ϵ-differential
privacy with a high probability (≥ 1 − δ ) [24, 34]. The probability
that generating the output with unbounded multiplicative differ-
ence for V and V ′ is bounded by δ .
2.3 VideoDP Framework
2.3.1 Limitation of PINQ-based Video Analytics. Privacy Inte-
grated Queries (PINQ) [36] platform was proposed to facilitate data
analytics by injecting Laplace noise into the queries required by the
analysis. Similarly, PINQ can be simply extended to function video
analytics. However, there are two major limitations of PINQ-based
video analytics, which greatly constrain the usability in practices.
• Sensitivity. In PINQ-based video analytics, global sensitiv-
ity [18] can be defined for some coarse-grained queries (with
small sensitivity) such as “the count of vehicles in the video”
(sensitivity as 1). However, for queries with large sensitiv-
ity (e.g., query across different frames where a video may
include thousands of frames), the output result would be
overly obfuscated (see experimental results in Section 6). For
instance, in the query “the average time (number of frames)
each object stays in the video”, since an object can stay in
the video for the entire video (all the frames) or only 1 sec-
ond (a few frames), global sensitivity would be too large and
difficult to define. Meanwhile, it might be also difficult to
achieve (smooth) local sensitivity [39] for many different
queries in the analysis due to computational overheads.
• Flexibility. PINQ is inflexible to be adapted for utility-driven
video analyses. For each requested analysis, a specific DP
scheme would be required for improving the utility of the
private analysis. The algorithm (e.g., budget allocation, com-
position of queries [36]) has to be redesigned for any new
analysis on the video.
Instead, we propose a novel universal framework VideoDP for
universally optimizing the utility of different video analyses, which
are detailed as follows.
2.3.2 VideoDP for Video Analytics. Figure 1 shows that VideoDP
consists of three major phases (after detecting all the VEs):
(1) Phase I: video (including detected VEs) can be represented
as pixels, which can be grouped by their RGBs (notice that,
different from generating RGB histograms, each pixel still
keeps its original features such as coordinates and frame ID).
Then, this phase samples pixels (with its original features) for
each RGB where privacy budgets are allocated for different
RGBs (sequential composition [36]) to optimize the output
utility. Phase I in VideoDP satisfies ϵ-differential privacy.
Details are given in Section 3.
(2) Phase II: after sampling all the pixels, the output video has nu-
merous unsampled pixels (due to privacy constraints). This
phase estimates the RGBs for unsampled pixels via interpo-
lation. We show that Phase II does not leak any additional
information (still ensuring indistinguishability). Thus, Phase
II can boost the video utility without additional privacy loss.
Details are given in Section 4.
(3) Phase III: for any query w.r.t. pixel, feature, visual elements,
etc.[11, 15, 29], VideoDP applies the requested query to the
random utility-driven private video and directly returns
the result (also probabilistic) to untrusted analysts. Then,
VideoDP can universally function any video analysis (which
can be decomposed into queries, similar to PINQ [36]) while
ensuring differential privacy (as analyzed in Section 4).
3 PHASE I: PIXEL SAMPLING
In this section, we illustrate the first phase of pixel sampling which
satisfies ϵ-differential privacy.
3.1 Pixel Sampling Mechanism
Recall that Section 2.3 has briefly discussed the pixel sampling. For
each RGB θi in V , a number of xi pixels (out of ci in the input
V ) will be randomly selected to output with their original coordi-
nates and frame ID (while bounding the probabilities for differen-
tial privacy). VideoDP allocates privacy budgets for different RGBs
to ensure differential privacy for the entire pixel sampling (e.g.,
e−ϵ ≤ Pr [A(V )=O ]Pr [A(V ′)=O ] ≤ eϵ ).
After pixel sampling, all the RGBs θi , i ∈ [1,m] in the same visual
element may result in privacy leakage in the output video. Then, the
differential privacy of overall sampling follows sequential composi-
tion [36] for all the RGBs. Since every video may involve millions
of distinct RGBs, given a privacy budget ϵ for pixel sampling, it is
nearly impossible to allocate an equal budget to every unique RGB
(each share would be negligible). To address such challenge, we
categorize all the RGBs i ∈ [1,m],θi for pixel sampling in different
cases (some of which indeed do not consume any privacy budget)
and explore the optimal budget allocation as well as the differential
privacy guarantee in Section 3.2.
3.2 Privacy Budget Allocation
As the privacy budget ϵ is specified for pixel sampling, our goal
is to optimize the allocated budgets for RGBs towards their count
distributions in the original video. GivenV andV ′whereV = V ′∪ϒ
(w.l.o.g.) and ϒ can be any VE, we have three types of RGBs:
• Case (1): RGB θi ∈ ϒ \V ′ (the RGB is included in the extra
visual element ϒ but not V ′).
• Case (2): RGB θi ∈ V ′ \ ϒ (the RGB is included in V ′ but not
the extra visual element ϒ).
• Case (3): RGB θi ∈ V ′ ∩ ϒ (the RGB is included in both V ′
and the extra visual element ϒ).
Then, we investigate the budget and the privacy guarantee for
these three cases as below.
3.2.1 Case (1): RGB θi ∈ ϒ \V ′. Pixels in this case is the reason
why we need the relax in definition, which we will discuss this in
the Section 5. Given xi as the output count of θi and ci is the input
count inV , we let xi = 0 (does not output pixels with such RGB θi )
since θi cannot be found inV ′, if generating any pixel with RGB θi
into the output video O (in Phase I).
Extending it to an randomization algorithm A applied to V
(with n VEs ϒ1, . . . , ϒn ), w.l.o.g., consideringV as the video with an
arbitrary extra VE ϒ ∈ {ϒ1, . . . , ϒn } (compared to V ′), we have:
• ∀j ∈ [1,n], ϒj , if RGB θi ∈ ϒj \ (V − ϒj ), then xi = 0 (do not
sample pixels with such RGB).
3.2.2 Case (2): RGB θi ∈ V ′ \ ϒ. Since all the pixels with such
RGB θi inV andV ′ are equivalent (identical coordinates and frame),
we can let xi = ci in VideoDP (retaining all the pixels with such RGB
θi ) without violating privacy. Then, for any xi > 0 (which can be
maximized to ci ), sampling pixels for this RGB θi does not consume
any privacy budget. Similarly, extending it to the randomization
algorithm A (applied to V ), w.l.o.g., considering V as the video
with an arbitrary extra VE ϒ ∈ {ϒ1, . . . , ϒn } (compared toV ′), since
VideoDP should protect any arbitrary VE, we have:
• ∀j ∈ [1,n], ϒj , if any RGB θi ∈ V ′\ϒj , then xi = ci (retaining
all the pixels with such RGB in the utility-driven private
video). This does not consume any privacy budget since
such RGBs do not exist in any of the VEs.
3.2.3 Case (3): RGB θi ∈ V ′ ∩ ϒ. The pixel sampling for each
RGB in this case should satisfy ϵ-differential privacy, and the overall
sampling makes e−ϵ ≤ Pr [A(V )=O ]Pr [A(V ′)=O ] ≤ eϵ hold. Thus, we should
allocate privacy budgets for different RGBs in this case.
However, due to the sequential composition [36], we cannot allo-
cate a budget for every RGB in this category (otherwise, given any
ϵ , for a large number of distinct RGBs, each share of the budget
would be too extremely small). In other words, all the RGBs in this
category may have to be suppressed (not sampled in the output
video). To improve the output utility, our VideoDP has the following
three procedures for budget allocation in pixel sampling (Phase I):
(1) Determine the RGBs selection rule (selecting the most repre-
sentative RGBs in each VE for generating the output video).
(2) Derive an optimal number of distinct RGBs within each VE
(maximizing the utility of the VEs in the output video).
(3) Allocate appropriate budgets for selected RGBs (per their
RGB count distribution in the original video).
1) RGBs Selection Rule. Denoting the number of distinct RGBs
in ϒj , j ∈ [1,n] (which receive privacy budgets to output after
Phase I) as kj , the remaining RGBs in ϒj will be suppressed (not
sampled) during pixel sampling. Thus, this procedure ensures that
the selected kj RGBs in ϒj are most representative to reconstruct
the object (without compromising privacy). An intuitive rule is to
select the top frequent kj RGBs in ϒj . However, it might be biased
to specific regions with intensive counts of similar RGBs in a VE.
To address such limitation, we adopt the multi-scale analysis [52]
in computer vision to partition each VE ϒj into kj cells and select
the top frequent RGB in each cell to allocate privacy budgets (as the
“representative RGBs”). Then, the sampled RGBs can be effective to
reconstruct the VE in the utility-driven private video.
2) Optimal kj in Each VE. This procedure is designed to maxi-
mize the utility of the VEs (i.e., object/human) in the utility-driven
private video (after bilinear interpolation [16] in Phase II). If the
number of distinct RGBs in ϒj that receive privacy budgets kj is
large, more distinct RGBs can be sampled in the VE but the budget
allocated for each RGB would be extremely small; if kj is small,
the budget allocated for each RGB would be large but less distinct
RGBs can be sampled. We now seek for the optimal kj for ϒj that
can minimize the MSE between the interpolated VE (after Phase II)
and the original VE.
Specifically, since every pixel in ϒj can be sampled (with the
original RGB) or unsampled (with an estimated RGB), we minimize
the expectation of MSE (referring to Equation 2) after the Phase II
bilinear interpolation [16]. The expectation of each pixel’s RGB is
determined by the probabilities of “sampled” (denoted as Pr (a,b, t))
and “unsampled and interpolated by its neighboring pixels” (4 neigh-
bors for a non-border pixel, 3 neighbors for a border-but-not-corner
pixel, and 2 neighbors for a corner pixel, as shown in Figure 4.
Denoting pixel (a,b, t)’s RGB in the output as θˆ (a,b, t), for sim-
plicity of notations, we denote the RGBs of its neighboring pixels
as θˆN , θˆS , θˆW and θˆE , for pixels (a − 1,b, t), (a + 1,b, t), (a,b − 1, t)
and (a,b + 1, t), respectively. For a non-border pixel (4 neighbors),
the expectation of its RGB 2 can be derived as:
E[θˆ (a, b, t )] = Pr (a, b, t ) ∗ θ (a, b, t ) + σ0(a, b, t ) ∗ 0
+
σ1(a, b, t )[1 − Pr (a, b, t )][E(θˆN ) + E(θˆS ) + E(θˆW ) + E(θˆE )]
4
+
σ2(a, b, t )[1 − Pr (a, b, t )][3E(θˆN ) + 3E(θˆS ) + 3E(θˆW ) + 3E(θˆE )]]
6 ∗ 2
+
σ3(a, b, t )[1 − Pr (a, b, t )][3E(θˆN ) + 3E(θˆS ) + 3E(θˆW ) + 3E(θˆE )]
4 ∗ 3
+
σ4(a, b, t )[1 − Pr (a, b, t )][E(θˆN ) + E(θˆS ) + E(θˆW ) + E(θˆE )]
4 (1)
2Although the RGB values of all the pixels in ϒj may be random (due to the differentially
private sampling in Phase I), the expectations of RGBs for its neighboring pixels in ϒj
always satisfy a condition (ensured by bilinear interpolation [16]), e.g., Equation 1.
where θ (a,b, t) is the original RGB (a constant) and probability
of “sampled” Pr (a,b, t) is determined by kj (given V and kj , it is
deterministic if the RGB selection rule is decided previously). Prob-
abilities σ0(a,b, t),σ1(a,b, t),σ2(a,b, t),σ3(a,b, t) and σ4(a,b, t) are
probabilities that pixel (a,b, t) has 0 neighbor, 1 neighbor, 2 neigh-
bors, 3 neighbors and 4 neighbors after sampling (which are also
constants if V , kj and sampling mechanism are determined; note
that σ0(a,b, t) + · · · + σ4(a,b, t) = 1). In the equation, E[θˆN ], E[θˆS ],
E[θˆW ] and E[θˆE ] are the RGB expectation of its four neighbors in
the same t th frame (Equation 1 presents the relation among the RGB
expectations of the five pixels, which are detailed in Appendix A.1).
Similarly, we can obtain two other equations for pixels with special
coordinates (border-but-not-corner or corner pixels of the frame,
please see Equation 14 and 15 in Appendix A.1).
Thus, for each pixel in VE ϒj (in all the frames), there exists
exactly one equation out of three cases in Equation 1, 14 and 15
(latter two are in Appendix A.1). As kj is determined, θ (a,b, t) and
Pr (a,b, t) are constants, then we can solve all the equations to
obtain ∀(a,b, t) ∈ ϒj ,E[θˆ (a,b, t)]. Thus, each kj value corresponds
to the solved ∀(a,b, t) ∈ ϒj ,E[θˆ (a,b, t)], and then we can efficiently
derive the optimal kj for ϒj as:
argmin
kj
1
|ϒj |
∑
∀(a,b,t )∈ϒj
(
E[θ (a,b, t)] − E[θˆ (a,b, t)])2 (2)
where |ϒj | denotes the total number of pixels in ϒj . Solving the
above problem requires complexity O(n3 log(n)), which is much
faster than executing pixel sampling for all the possible kj and then
comparing all the MSE results to get the optimal kj (since iteratively
sampling all the pixels is expensive). For details of the solver, please
refer to Appendix A.2. Notice that,
• Range for kj . The optimal kj is derived from a specified
range of kj . It is unnecessary to traverse kj to a extremely
large number (otherwise, the allocated budget for each RGB
would be extremely small). The larger kj , more diverse RGBs
can be allocated with a privacy budget; the smaller kj , each
RGB will be allocated with a larger privacy budget. Thus,
the lower/upper bounds for kj can be selected according
the requested diversity of RGBs in the visual elements in
practice (kj ≤ 20 can give good utility in our experiments).
• Approximation. As discussed before, since ϒj in different
frames may have different sizes and different sets of RGBs
(though the difference can be minor), the most accurate kj
can be obtained by solving the equations for all the pixels of
ϒj in all the frames (with complexity O(n3 log(n)), as proven
in Appendix A). If more efficient solvers are desirable, we can
randomly select a frame (including ϒj ) to solve the equations
to obtain an approximated kj for ϒj by assuming the VE does
not change much in the video. Another alternative solution
is to solve the optimal kj for each frame and average them
(which is more efficient but less accurate).
Therefore, we can repeat the above procedure for all the VEs
such that the optimal kj , j ∈ [1,n] can be obtained to minimize the
MSE of the VEs in the utility-driven private video.
3) Budget Allocation. As the optimal kj for each visual element
ϒj , j ∈ [1,n] is derived, we denote the set of RGBs in ϒj , j ∈ [1,n]
to allocate budgets as Ψj with the cardinality |Ψj | = kj . Then, we
have the total number of RGBs to sample in V (Case (3)) as the
cardinality |Ψ| of the union Ψ = ⋃nj=1 Ψj . We then present how
to allocate privacy budget ϵ in Phase I for |Ψ| different RGBs. The
criterion for allocating budget is to allocate the privacy budgets
based on the count distributions of RGBs in different VEs while
fully utilizing the privacy budget ϵ . For each VE ϒj , all the RGBs in
Ψj can fully enjoy the budget ϵ (since Ψj includes all the RGBs that
could generate visual element ϒj in all the frames, and other RGBs
would not be sampled into the visual element ϒj ).3
Then, we denote the ith RGB in Ψj as θ˜i j where i ∈ [1,kj ], and
the count of θ˜i j in ϒj as dj (θ˜i j ) and the overall pixel count in ϒj
(in all frames) as dj . Apparently, we can allocate
dj (θ˜i j )ϵ
dj
to RGB
θ˜ j (i), i ∈ [1,kj ] and apply this criterion to all the VEs. However, if
any RGB θ˜ is included in multiple VEs (the intersections among the
sets ∀j ∈ [1,n],Ψj ), θ˜ will receive privacy budgets from different
VEs (and should satisfy differential privacy for all of them). At this
time, its budget should be allocated as the minimum one out of all
(otherwise, not all the VEs in pixel sampling can be protected with
ϵ-differential privacy since the budget for some VEs may exceed ϵ).
Nevertheless, if the minimum budget is adopted as above, some
VEs cannot fully enjoy ϵ (the gap between θ˜ ’s original budget in a
specific VE and its minimum budget among all the VEs would be
wasted). To fully utilize the privacy budgets, we propose a budget
allocation algorithm for all the |Ψ| distinct RGBs by prioritizing
them in the RGB set Ψ =
⋃n
j=1 Ψj .
…
RGBs in ϒ1, …, ϒn (all VEs)
RGBs in
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Figure 2: Prioritizing RGBs (for allocating budgets)
Specifically, we prioritize |Ψ| different RGBs into n disjoint par-
titions: as shown in Figure 2 (from top to down), RGBs in the first
partition are included in all the VEs, RGBs in the second partition
are included in (n − 1) VEs, . . . , RGBs in the nth partition are only
included in a single VE. Then, our algorithm iteratively allocates
budgets for RGBs in n partitions (allocating budgets for all the RGBs
in a partition in each iteration).
Since all the RGBs within each VE follow sequential composition
[36] to split ϵ , after allocating the budgets for all the RGBs in the
ℓth partition, the allocation in the (ℓ + 1)th partition will be based
on the remaining budget out of ϵ for every VE. In the ℓth iteration
(for the ℓth partition), the budget for each RGB θ˜ is allocated based
on its count distribution out of the remaining RGBs in each of the
3Any two VEs (e.g., humans or objects) do not share pixels in the video since the front
VE blocks a part of the back VE if they overlap in any frame.
(n−ℓ+1) VEs (which include θ˜ ). Then, theminimum budget derived
from all the VEs is allocated to θ˜ .
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Υ1
20
B
55
O
Υ2
5030 50
GB P
Iteration (1) ݉݅݊ሺʹͲε͹ͷ ǡ ͵Ͳεͳ͵Ͳ ǡ ͳͷε͹Ͳ ሻ
Iteration (3) ହହହହ ȉ (ε െ ଵହε଻଴ )= ହହε଻଴ ହହ ȉ (ε - ଵହε଻଴ - ଵଵεଶ଼ )= ଵଵεଶ଼ ଷ଴ଷ଴ ȉ (ε - ଵହε଻଴ - ଵଵεଶ଼ ) ൌ ଵଵεଶ଼
Υ3
15 35 30
GB R
݉݅݊ሺͳͳεʹͺ ǡ ͳͳεʹ͸ ሻ
Figure 3: Example of Budget Allocation
Example 3.1. In Figure 3, there are three VEs ϒ1, ϒ2, ϒ3 in the
video. Blue exists in all the VEs ϒ1, ϒ2, ϒ3 with counts 20, 30, 15.
Green exists in ϒ2 and ϒ3 with counts 50 and 35. All the remaining
RGBs only exist in only one VE (and the non-VE part of the video):
Orange in ϒ1 with count 55, Purple in ϒ2 with count 5, and Red in
ϒ3 with count 30. Thus, five different RGBs are prioritized (three
partitions): {B}, {G}, and {O, P, R}.
In the 1st iteration (partition), Blue is first allocated with a
privacy budget as the min{ 20ϵ75 , 30ϵ130 , 15ϵ70 } (the minimum budget
from three different VEs). The remaining budget for all the VEs is
55ϵ
70 . In the 2nd iteration, Green is allocated with a privacy budget
55ϵ
70 ·min{ 50100 , 3565 } = min{ 11ϵ28 , 11ϵ26 }. In the 3rd iteration, Orange is
allocated with budget 5555 · (ϵ − 15ϵ70 ) = 55ϵ70 , Purple is allocated with
budget 55 · (ϵ − 15ϵ70 − 11ϵ28 ) = 11ϵ28 , and Red is allocated with budget
30
30 · (ϵ − 15ϵ70 − 11ϵ28 ) = 11ϵ28 .
Since almost all the VEs have RGBs in the last partition (every
VE in real videos include numerous RGBs that are not included
in other VEs), the budget can be fully allocated for all the RGBs
(the budget sum of all the RGBs in any VE equals ϵ). Algorithm 3 in
Appendix B presents the details of budget allocation.
3.3 Pixel Sampling Algorithm
To illustrate the algorithm for Phase I, we again discuss the pixel
sampling for three different cases of RGBs.
Recall that in Case (1), for all the RGBs θi ∈ ϒ \V ′, all the pixels
with such RGBs will not be sampled (ensuring that δ = 0). In Case
(2), for all the RGBs θi ∈ V ′ \ ϒ, all the pixels with such RGBs will
be sampled (with the original coordinates and frame). Sampling
pixels for all the RGBs in Case (2) satisfy 0-DP.
In Case (3), for all the RGBs θi ∈ V ′ ∩ ϒ, as discussed in Section
3.2, we sample pixels for |Ψ| distinct RGBs where |Ψ| ≤ ∑nj=1 kj
(since different VEs may have common RGBs). We denote the set
Ψ =
⋃n
j=1 Ψj = {θ˜1, . . . , θ˜ |Ψ |} (the set of RGBs which request
privacy budgets), and its set of budgets {ϵ(θ˜1), . . . , ϵ(θ˜ |Ψ |)}. It is
straightforward to show the sequential composition [36] of allocated
privacy budgets (by Algorithm 3) for all the RGBs:∑
∀θ˜i ∈Ψj
ϵ (θ˜i ) = ϵ (3)
where θ˜i is denoted as the ith RGB in Ψ. Then, for anyV andV ′
differing in an arbitrary VE ϒj , j ∈ [1,n],
∀θ˜i ∈ Ψj , e−ϵ (θ˜i ) ≤ Pr [A(V (θ˜i )) = O(θ˜i )]
Pr [A(V ′(θ˜i )) = O(θ˜i )]
≤ eϵ (θ˜i ) (4)
where V (θ˜i ) and V ′(θ˜i ) are the pixels with RGB θ˜i in V and V ′.
Deriving the probability for randomly picking x˜i out of c˜i pixels
with RGB θ˜i (pixel sampling using input V and V ′, differing in ϒj ),
we have:
∀i ∈ [1, |Ψ|], Pr [A(V (θ˜i )) = O(θ˜i )] = 1/
(
c˜i
x˜i
)
Pr [A(V ′(θ˜i )) = O(θ˜i )] = 1/
(˜
ci − c˜ ji
x˜i
)
=⇒ e−ϵ (θ˜i ) ≤
(
c˜i
x˜i
)/ (˜ci − c˜ ji
x˜i
)
≤ eϵ (θ˜i ) (5)
where c˜i and x˜i are the input and output counts of RGB θ˜i while
c˜
j
i denotes the count of θ˜i in VE ϒj .
Thus, we can derive a maximum output count for sampling pixels
for each RGB θ˜i , i ∈ [1, |Ψ|] and the maximum x˜i can be efficiently
computed as below (the only variable): ∀i ∈ [1, |Ψ|],
max{x˜i |∀j ∈ [1,n],
(
c˜i
x˜i
)/ (˜ci − c˜ ji
x˜i
)
≤ eϵ (θ˜i )} (6)
The maximum output count of the ith RGB x˜i , i ∈ [1, |Ψ|] can
be efficiently computed from Equation 6 (e.g., via binary search)
since the left-side of the inequality is monotonic on x˜i . To sum up,
Algorihtm 1 presents the details of Phase I.
Algorithm 1: Pixel Sampling (ϵ-DP)
Input : input video V , privacy budget ϵ
Output : sampled video O (pixels)
1 detect all the visual elements (ϒ1, . . . , ϒn ) in V
// Case (1)
2 foreach ϒj , j ∈ [1, n] do
3 foreach RGB θi ∈ ϒj but < (V \ ϒj ) do
4 suppress all ci pixels with RGB θi in V
// Case (2)
5 foreach RGB θi ∈ V \⋃nj=1 ϒj do
6 output all ci pixels with RGB θi in V (original coordinates and
frame)
// Case (3)
7 foreach ϒj , j ∈ [1, n] do
8 compute the optimal number of distinct RGBs to sample in ϒj
(minimum expectation of MSE): kj
9 execute Algorithm 3 (in Appendix 3) to allocate budgets for all the
RGBs in Ψ = {θ˜1, . . . , θ˜ |Ψ| }
10 foreach θ˜i , i ∈ [1, |Ψ |] do
11 compute the maximum x˜i :
max{x˜i |∀j ∈ [1, n], (c˜ix˜i ) / (c˜i−c˜ jix˜i ) ≤ eϵ (θ˜i ) }
12 randomly pick x˜i pixels with RGB θ˜i in V to output (original
coordinates and frame)
Theorem 3.2. The pixels sampling in VideoDP (Phase I) satisfies
ϵ-differential privacy.
Proof. We can prove the differential privacy guarantee for three
cases of pixel sampling in the algorithm.
In Case (1), since all the pixels with such RGBs are suppressed,
δ = 0 always holds with Line 2-4 in Algorithm 1. In Case (2), since
∀θi , Pr [A(V (θi ))=O (θi )]Pr [A(V ′(θi ))=O (θi )] always equals 1, Line 5-6 in Algorithm 1
does not result in privacy loss. In Line 7-12 of the algorithm (Case
(3)), we have ∀i ∈ [1, |Ψ|], e−ϵ (θ˜i ) ≤ Pr [A(V (θ˜i ))=O (θ˜i )]
Pr [A(V ′(θ˜i ))=O (θ˜i )]
≤ eϵ (θ˜i )
holds. Per the sequential composition of differential privacy [36], for
all V and V ′ differing in any VE ϒj , j ∈ [1,n], we have:
∏
∀θ˜i ∈Ψj
Pr [A(V (θ˜i )) = O (θ˜i )]
Pr [A(V ′(θ˜i )) = O (θ˜i )]
≤ exp[
∑
∀θ˜i ∈Ψj
ϵ (θ˜i )]
∏
∀θ˜i ∈Ψj
Pr [A(V (θ˜i )) = O (θ˜i )]
Pr [A(V ′(θ˜i )) = O (θ˜i )]
≥ exp[−
∑
∀θ˜i ∈Ψj
ϵ (θ˜i )]
=⇒ e−ϵ ≤ Pr [A(V ) = O ]
Pr [A(V ′) = O ] ≤ e
ϵ (7)
Thus, this completes the proof. □
Discussion. In case of V ′ = V ∪ ϒ, adding an arbitrary VE ϒ to V
to generate V ′. Similarly, for all θ˜i , x˜i can also be derived from V ′
and V to ensure differential privacy for pixel sampling.
4 PHASE II AND PHASE III
After sampling pixels in Phase I, the suppressed pixels in Case (1)
and unsampled pixels in Case (3) in the output do not have any RGB
(as shown in Figure 4). Then, Phase II generates the utility-driven
private video (random) by estimating the RGBs for the missing
pixels to boost utility with computer vision techniques, and Phase III
responds to the queries (over the private video) for video analytics.
4.1 Phase II: Generating Utility-driven Private
Video (Random)
sampled
in Case (3)
suppressed 
in Case (1) or
unsampled in 
Case (3)
retained
in Case (2)
frame t
Figure 4: Pixels after Sampling (Phase I)
For all the coordinates with a RGB value after sampling, the
RGBs of such pixels can be estimated using bilinear interpolation
[16]. As discussed in Section 3.2, the allocated privacy budgets have
been shown to optimize the utility of both sampling and bilinear
interpolation, e.g., the optimal number of RGBs selected in each VE
for sampling kj tends to minimize the expectation of MSE between
the utility-driven private video (after interpolation) and the original
video. Thus, Phase II can directly apply bilinear interpolation.
For simplification of notations, we consider both retained pixels
and sampled pixels as “sampled pixels”, and both suppressed pixels
and unsampled pixels as “unsampled pixels”. Specifically,
• In the output video of Phase I, pixels (not on the border) have
at most 4 neighbors in each frame; the pixels on the border
of each frame (not corner) have at most 3 neighbors; the
pixels at the corner of each frame have at most 2 neighbors.
• The algorithm interpolates pixels in visual elements and the
remaining pixels (background), separately. For each interpo-
lation, it traverses all the unsampled pixels in all the frames
(e.g., a specific visual element). If any unsampled pixel has
any sampled neighbor(s), the RGB for current unsampled
pixel is estimated as the mean of all its sampled neighbors.
• If any unsampled pixel’s all the neighbors are also unsam-
pled, the algorithm skips such unsampled pixel in the current
traversal. The algorithm iteratively traverses all the skipped
unsampled pixels. The algorithm terminates until every un-
sampled pixel is assigned with an interpolated RGB. In our
experiments, the interpolation terminates very quickly since
the RGB of any pixel can be readily estimated as long as it
has at least one neighbor which is sampled or previously
interpolated.
• If any visual element does not have a sampled pixel in any
frame, the interpolation of the pixels for the visual element
in such frame will be executed with the remaining pixels
(background) V \⋃nj=1 ϒj .
Algorithm 2 presents the details of pixel interpolation. Notice
that, besides interpolating pixels in each frame, Phase II also interpo-
lates the VEs in specific frames (if none of their pixels are sampled
in the frames but they are sampled in the neighboring frames).
Such VEs will be inserted into the corresponding frames where the
coordinates/RGBs are estimated by averaging their interpolated
results in the neighboring frames.
Algorithm 2: Pixel Interpolation
Input :output video O in Phase I
Output :utility-driven private video O
// interpolating pixels in VEs
1 foreach VE ϒj , j ∈ [1, n] do
2 extract all the unsampled pixels in ϒj with their frame,
coordinates, and RGBs (U ← ϒj \O )
3 repeat
4 foreach unsampled pixel p ∈ U do
5 if p’s all the neighbors in U then
6 continue
7 else
8 calculate the RGB mean of p’s sampled neighbors (in
O ) and assign it to p
9 O← O ∪ p and U ← U \ p
10 until U = ∅;
// interpolating background pixels
11 repeat Line 1-10 for all the pixels in V \⋃nj=1 ϒj
4.2 Video Analytics and Privacy Analysis
Similar to the framework of PINQ for data analytics [36], VideoDP
can also function most of the analyses performed on videos. If
breaking down any video analysis into queries, VideoDP (Phase III)
directly applies the queries to the utility-driven private video (which
is randomly generated in Phase I and II) and return the results to
untrusted analysts. For any query created at the pixel, feature or
visual element level [11, 15, 29], VideoDP (Phase III) could efficiently
respond the results with differential privacy guarantee.
Theorem 4.1. VideoDP satisfies ϵ-differential privacy.
Proof. Recall that we have proven Phase I satisfies ϵ-differential
privacy in Theorem 3.2. We now prove that Phase II and III do not
result in additional privacy risks.
Since Phase I in VideoDP satisfies ϵ-differential privacy, for any
pair of neighboring videosV andV ′, we have e−ϵ ≤ Pr [A(V )=O ]Pr [A(V )=O ] ≤
eϵ . Such differential privacy satisfies ϵ-probabilistic differential pri-
vacy [24, 34], which also satisfies ϵ-indistinguishability differential
privacy [17, 18] (bounding Pr [A(V ) ∈ S] and Pr [A(V ′) ∈ S]where
S is any set of possible outputs), as proven in Proposition C.1 in
Appendix C [24, 34].
Then, after applying VideoDP to inputs V and V ′, the outputs
of Phase I are ϵ-indistinguishable. Since the pixel interpolation
(Phase II) and video queries/analysis (Phase III) are deterministic
procedures applied to the output of Phase I (which can be considered
as post-processing differentially private results), the output O of
Phase II and the analysis/query results of Phase III derived from
inputs V and V ′ are also ϵ-indistinguishable (“Differential privacy
is immune to post-processing” has been proven in [19]). Therefore,
VideoDP also satisfies ϵ-differential privacy. □
The procedures and privacy guarantee in VideoDP can be inter-
preted as follows. Given any two videosV andV ′ that differ in one
VE (e.g, a pedestrian), Phase I and II generate ϵ-indistinguishable
utility-driven private video (which is random) for V and V ′, re-
spectively. Performing any query (e.g., the count of pedestrians)
over the two indistinguishable utility-driven private video, the
query/analysis results are also indistinguishable.
5 DISCUSSION
Relaxed Differential Privacy: in general, Theorem 4.1 guaran-
tees that the query/analysis results satisfy ϵ-DP. However, in some
extreme cases, if real query result in video V equals one and the
result in V ′ is zero (e.g., query is only related to the extra VE), we
have to adopt (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy (Definition 2.2) in VideoDP.
In such cases, the pixel sampling in VideoDP (Phase I) makes the
output of V to be ϵ-indisintiguishable as the output of V ′ where
the extra VE is suppressed with high probability (≥ 1 − δ ). Then,
such query over the utility-driven private video derived byV would
return 0 with high probability (still ensuring indistinguishability
and differential privacy). For simplicity of cases, we only focus on
generic queries/analysis in this paper.
Non-Sensitive Visual Elements: before generating videos by
VideoDP, sensitive visual elements are detected and specified for
differentially private protection. If some objects and/or humans are
unnecessary to protect (e.g., considered as non-sensitive), VideoDP
can leave them with the background scene and retain more utility
for them in the utility-driven private video.
Arbitrary Background Knowledge: differential privacy ensures
protection/indistinguishability against arbitrary background knowl-
edge. VideoDP is proposed to only protect the visual elements (e.g.,
sensitive objects and humans). Thus, the background knowledge is
assumed to be any information on the visual elements which are
detected/specified to be protected.
Defense against Correlations: videos include numerous frames,
if protecting specific visual elements in only one frame, the correla-
tions in sequential frames may also leak information to adversaries
[10, 46]. Our VideoDP can address such vulnerabilities since all the
visual elements in all the frames are protected using our defined
privacy notion – adding or removing any visual element in any
number of frames would not result in significant risks. From this
perspective, the privacy notion is defined for the entire period of
the video, rather than a specific time. Thus, possible privacy leakage
resulted from correlations among multiple frames can be tackled.
6 EXPERIMENTS
In VideoDP, we implement the detection of visual elements (VEs)
in the entire video using the tracking algorithm [50, 51], which
first detects all the VEs in each frame, and then utilizes the tensor-
flow training database to tag humans/objects which are considered
as sensitive VEs in different scenarios/videos. Each detected hu-
man/object can be tracked with the same ID if their overlap in
multiple frames has exceeded a threshold (such algorithm has a
high detection/tracking accuracy [51]). We conduct our experiments
on two real high-resolution videos in which different VEs are pro-
tected (characteristics are presented in Table 1).
Table 1: Characteristics of Experimental Videos
Video Resolution Frame # RGBs VEs
PED 1920 × 1080 1,050 546,430 83
VEH 1280 × 720 540 290,172 115
(1) MOT16-04 (pedestrian street) [37]: 83 pedestrians are con-
sidered as sensitive visual elements in 1,050 frames (546,430
distinct RGBs). For simplicity of notations, we denote this
video as “PED”.
(2) Vehicle Detection Video [2]: 115 vehicles in the video are
considered as sensitive visual elements in 540 frames (290,172
distinct RGBs). For simplicity of notations, we denote this
video as “VEH”.
All the programswere implemented in Python 3.6.4withOpenCV
3.4.0 library [3] and tested on an HP PC with Intel Core i7-7700
CPU 3.60GHz and 32G RAM.
6.1 Evaluating Utility-driven Private Video
We first evaluate the utility of the videos randomly generated by
Phase I and II which directly reflects the universal utility for dif-
ferent video analyses. We consider the RGB color model [7] by
breaking down the videos into pixels with RGBs at different coordi-
nates and frames, and then measure the differences between input
V and output O . Specifically, we evaluate two types of utility: (1)
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Figure 5: Pixel Level Utility Evaluation
the difference between the count distributions of all the RGBs in V
and O , and (2) the difference between RGB values of all the pixels
in V and O .
First, considering the distributions of all the RGBs’ counts ∀xi
and ∀ci in the output and input, we can measure the utility loss
using their KL-divergence for the following reason.
• If the distribution of RGBs lie closes in the input and output
videos, the performance of pixel interpolation (estimating
RGBs for unsampled pixels based on the RGBs of sampled
pixels) can be greatly improved [16]. For other measures,
e.g., L1 norm, the output counts of different RGBs might be
biased towards certain RGBs with high counts such that the
interpolated RGBs might be significantly deviated.
Thus, we adapt the KL-divergence based utility loss function in
our VideoDP as:
DKL =
m∑
i=1
[ ci
|V | · log(
ci
|V | ·
|O |
xi + 1
)
]
(8)
wherem denotes the number of distinct RGBs in the inputV , and
|V | and |O | denote the total pixel counts in the input V and output
O . Moreover, ci denotes the pixel count with RGB θi in V whereas
xi represents such count inO . Since xi may equal 0, we use (xi + 1)
to replace xi (for avoiding zero-denominator) in which (xi + 1) lies
very close to xi in the context of videos. Then, we use the above
function to evaluate the utility loss in VideoDP (the privacy budget
is also allocated by following the distribution of RGB counts).
Second, after interpolating all the pixels in the Phase II ofVideoDP,
we measure the difference between all the pixels’ RGB values in V
and O using the expectation of mean squared error (MSE):
E(MSE) = 1|V |
∑
∀(a,b,t )
(
E[θ (a, b, t )] − E[θˆ (a, b, t )])2 (9)
where θ (a,b, t) and θˆ (a,b, t) represent the RGB for pixel with
coordinates (a,b) and frame t in V and O , and E(·) denotes the
expectation. The 3-dimensional RGBs are generally converted to
gray for measuring the MSE [5], which can also be normalized to
values in [0, 1].
Specifically, we conducted experiments to test how privacy bud-
get ϵ influences the utility of the output videos. We fix k (not
optimal) for all the visual elements in two videos, and vary the
privacy budget ϵ in the range from 0.8 to 2.8. Figure 5(a) and 5(b)
present the KL-divergence values (where for all visual elements
kj , j ∈ [1,n] is fixed as 6 and 10, respectively). Since KL values vary
on the count distribution of sampled RGBs, we can observe that the
KL values have different trends for different videos (PED and VEH)
regardless of how ϵ varies. For instance, in video PED, the KL value
first increases and then decreases as ϵ grows while it monotonically
increases and then converges as ϵ increases in video VEH (since
different videos may have very different RGB histograms).
In addition, we also evaluated the normalized MSE of the output
videos (after Phase I, and after Phase II). Figure 5(c) and 5(d) show
that the MSE (of the entire video) declines as ϵ increases. This
matches the fact that larger ϵ trades off more privacy for better
utility. Also, the normalized MSE has been greatly reduced after
Phase II – comparing the results in Figure 5(c) and 5(d), which
greatly improves the accuracy of the queries for video analyses. We
also test how the parameter kj affects the output utility, and the
optimal kj (based on minimum MSEs) is shown in Appendix D.
6.2 Evaluating Video Queries/Analysis
We now evaluate the utility of private queries for video analyses. It
is worth noting that the utility-driven private video randomly gen-
erated in VideoDP can function any analysis, such as head counting,
crowd density estimation and traffic flow analysis [2, 25, 37] in
our experimental videos. We examine some representative queries
for video analysis and compared the results with PINQ-based [36]
video query/analysis.
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Figure 6: Visual Elements Detection and Tracking
6.2.1 Pedestrian/Vehicle Detection. In our first set of experi-
ments, we have evaluated the detection/tracking accuracy. Consid-
ering the detection/tracking results applied to two original videos as
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Figure 7: RGB Histograms in PED and VEH
the benchmark, we test the precision and recall of detecting/tracking
humans and objects in the outputs. Specifically, precision returns the
percent of true pedestrians/vehicles out of all the detected/tracked
results in the videos. Recall returns the percent of detected/tracked
true pedestrians/vehicles out of all the true pedestrians/vehicles
(the benchmarking results obtained from the original videos). Figure
6 demonstrates the precision and recall on varying privacy budget
ϵ . The precision can always be maintained with a high accuracy
(close to 1). The recall grows quickly as ϵ increases (since larger ϵ
can generate more accurate random private videos).
6.2.2 RGB Histograms. We next compare VideoDP and PINQ
[36] using representative video queries/analysis at the pixel and
visual elements levels. Pixel level analysis plays an important role
in different applications (e.g., frame classification)[11]. If queries
are applied to pixels in a frame or video, the sensitivity might be
extremely large using PINQ [36] since adding or removing a visual
element may lead to thousands of changed pixels (w.r.t. the visual
element). For instance, an important pixel level query requests
“the RGB histogram of some frames in a video” [44], the sensitivity
should be themaximum number of pixels involved in different visual
elements in the frames. Figure 7 demonstrates the RGB histograms
for a representative frame in video PED and VEH.We set the privacy
budget ϵ as 0.8, and the sensitivity in PINQ for video PED and
VEH would be greater than 1000. Then, the PINQ results are more
fluctuated and significantly deviated as shown in Figure 7(b) and
7(e). We can also observe that results of utility-driven private video
lie closer to the original results even if privacy budget ϵ is small
(see Figure 7(c) and 7(f)).
6.2.3 Pedestrian/Vehicle Stay Time. Besides the pixel level queries,
VideoDP can also privately return query results for detected visual
elements in different applications. For instance, a query returns
“how long each pedestrian/vehicle stays in the video” (denoted as
stay time or number of stay frames). Then, pedestrians/vehicles are
detected/tracked in all the frames, and then query results can be
computed/aggregated and returned for private analysis.
(1) Pedestrians. In the PED video, 83 pedestrians are walking on
the street. How long each pedestrian stays in the video can be
utilized to learn the human behavior. Figure 8 presents the original
results, PINQ results and VideoDP results for the PED video where
three different privacy budgets ϵ (0.8, 1.6 and 2.4) are specified.
The 83 pedestrians in the PED video (marked on the x axis), and
the stay time is ranked from short to long (see the red curve in
two subfigures). In PINQ (Figure 8(a)), the stay times of all the
pedestrians are overly obfuscated even if ϵ is large since sensitivity
∆ should be set as 60 (for even longer videos, ∆ should be larger).
Nevertheless, VideoDP significantly outperforms PINQ for such
query/analysis. As shown in Figure 8(b), in case of ϵ = 0.8 (small
privacy budget), approximately 40 distinct pedestrians are detected
in the utility driven video. Although not all the pedestrians are
sampled in VideoDP, the distribution of all the stay times (of all
the sampled pedestrians) still lies close to the original result. As ϵ
increases to 1.6, the query results obtained from VideoDP converges
to the original results (however, PINQ results are still fluctuated).
(2) Vehicle. In the VEH video, there are 115 distinct vehicles driv-
ing on the highway. We define the two-way moving directions as
“upstream” and “downstream”, respectively. Figure 9 demonstrates
the length of time the vehicles stay in the video (upstream and
downstream), which can be utilized to estimate the moving speed
of vehicles, queue length estimation, etc. We can draw similar obser-
vations for the stay times of vehicles for both moving downstream
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Figure 9: Vehicle Stay Time
direction and upstream direction in the VEH video as the pedes-
trians in the PED video. VideoDP significantly outperforms PINQ
which requests a high sensitivity in such query.
6.2.4 Vehicle Density. We also conduct experiments to compare
VideoDP and PINQ on queries which request a smaller sensitivity.
For instance, the vehicle density query over the video returns the
vehicle count in each frame of the video (sensitivity ∆ = 1), which
can also facilitate the analyst to learn the traffic flow.
Figure 10 demonstrates the count of detected vehicles in each
frame, including the original results, PINQ results (Figure 10(a))
and VideoDP results (Figure 10(b)) where three different privacy
budgets ϵ (0.8, 1.6 and 2.4) are also specified. Note that every vehicle
only appears in a few frames of the video (this also occurs in longer
videos). The noise results are both acceptable in PINQ (∆ = 1) and
VideoDP. However, the counts of vehicles are more fluctuated in
PINQ as ϵ is small.
6.2.5 Complex Analysis. Since any video analysis algorithm
can be broken down into queries, complex analysis such as RGB
histogram analysis [44] and deep learning [30] can also be directly
applied to the (random) utility-driven private video while ensuring
ϵ-DP for VideoDP. At this time, PINQ-based differentially private
scheme should be redesigned for each analysis with appropriate
privacy budget allocation and composition analysis. Indeed, our
VideoDP can address such limitation of PINQ with better flexibility.
Due to space limit, we leave the experimental studies for different
complex analyses as our future work.
6.3 Computational Performance
We have also evaluated the computational performance of our
VideoDP (especailly Phase I and II). To generate a utility-driven
private video for a high-resolution video (e.g., video PED includes
1920 × 1080 pixels in each frame), it takes around 20 minutes to
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Figure 10: Vehicle Count in Each Frame
detect and track all the visual elements, sample pixels (including
optimizing each kj ), and interpolate the video. Similarly, it takes
around 12 minutes to generate a synthetic video for video VEH
(1280 × 720 pixels in each frame) by executing all the procedures
in VideoDP. Such one-time computation is acceptable to process
billions of pixels (offline cost), and then multiple queries/analysis
can be directly applied to the private video.
For longer videos, we can split the input video into multiple
fragments (e.g., 1 minute per fragment). Then, we can still apply
VideoDP to efficiently generate the utility-driven private videos for
all the fragments which are integrated later. In many videos (e.g.,
trafficmonitoring videos), VEsmove rapidly and appear in the video
for a few seconds. Then, fragmentation, generation and integration
would not affect the performance (if each visual element can be
protected in a fragment and do not appear in multiple fragments, it
can also be protected in the integrated video). In case that certain VEs
stay in a video for a long time, considering them as different VEs in
different fragments to protect may change the privacy protection in
the integrated output video. To address this in such VEs, we can split
the privacy budget w.r.t. each VE to shares for different segments
(sequential composition [36]). This may lower the probability of
retaining such VEs in the output, but it could greatly improve the
efficiency and scalability.
Finally, the runtime for deriving the private query/analysis re-
sults from the utility-driven private video for analysts (Phase III)
in VideoDP is quite close to querying/analyzing the original video
(which is expected to be more efficient than PINQ).
7 RELATEDWORK
Dwork [17] first proposed the notion of differential privacy that pro-
vides rigorous privacy protection regardless of background knowl-
edge. In literature, such rigorous privacy notion has been extended
to sanitize and release data in statistical databases [18], histograms
[13], location data [41], search logs [31], and graphs [26], etc. To
our best knowledge, we take the first step to address the deficiency
in differentially private video analysis. In particular, sampling based
randomization mechanisms have been proposed to generate proba-
bilistic true data from the input datasets while ensuring differential
privacy (e.g., microdata [9, 33], search logs [28]). Our utility-driven
private video is randomly generated via pixel sampling, and uni-
versally supports any video analysis with differential privacy.
Since VideoDP locally perturbs the input video by the video
owner (and then flexibly offers queries/analysis to untrusted an-
alysts), the emerging local differential privacy (LDP) models [8,
12, 20] are also relevant to this work. The state-of-the-art LDP
models perturb local data by the owners to generate statistics for
histograms/heavy hitters [8, 20, 42, 48], reconstruct social graphs
[43], and function frequent itemset mining [49].
Most of the existing video sanitization techniques use straight-
forward measures for quantifying the privacy loss in videos. For
instance, in [22, 38], if faces are present, then it is considered as
complete privacy loss, otherwise no privacy loss. Besides only con-
sidering the faces as privacy leakage, recent works also investigated
the privacy leakage in the activities, visited places and other im-
plicit channels (e.g., when and where the video is recorded) [45].
Fan [21] applied Laplace noise to obfuscate pixels in an image to en-
sure differential privacy for protecting specific regions of an image.
However, the image quality has been significantly reduced. Both
the privacy notion and the Laplace noise (high sensitivity) cannot
be applied to pixels in videos.
Moreover, most existing techniques directly adopted computer
vision techniques [22, 32] to first detect faces and/or other sensitive
regions in the video frames and then obscure them. However, such
detect-and-protect solutions have some limitations. For instance, the
detect-and-protect techniques cannot formally quantify and bound
the privacy leakage. Thus, the video owner does not know how
much risks any individual can be identified from the video. In addi-
tion, blurred regions might still be reconstructed by deep learning
methods [35, 40]. Our VideoDP can address these limitations with
strong privacy protection against arbitrary prior knowledge.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, to the best of our knowledge, we take the first step
to study the problem of video analysis with differential privacy
guarantee. Specifically, we have proposed a new sampling based dif-
ferentially private mechanism to randomly generate utility-driven
private videos. VideoDP has also provided a universal platform for
analysts to privately conduct any query/analysis over the (random)
utility-driven private video with differential privacy guarantee. We
have conducted extensive experiments to validate that the per-
formance of VideoDP significantly outperforms PINQ-based video
analyses in many different applications.
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Appendices
A OPTIMAL kj FOR VE ϒj
A.1 Equations for Different Pixels
If pixel (a,b, t) is a non-border pixel, we have Equation 1 to rep-
resent the relation between the RGB expectation of any pixel (a,b, t)
and the RGB expectation of its four neighbors (denoted as θˆN , θˆS , θˆW
and θˆE ). We now briefly discuss how to derive such relation.
First, if pixel (a,b, t) is sampled, then the RGB expectation equals
Pr (a,b, t) ∗ θ (a,b, t) where Pr (a,b, t) is the probability of sampling
(a,b, t) and θ (a,b, t) denotes its RGB in the original video V .
Second, if pixel (a,b, t) is not sampled, then it will be inter-
polated based on the RGBs of its neighbors. There are five sub-
cases (denoting the probabilities that (a,b, t) has 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4
neighbors before interpolation as σ0(a,b, t),σ1(a,b, t), σ2(a,b, t),
σ3(a,b, t),σ4(a,b, t), respectively):
(1) 0 neighbor: all its neighbors are not sampled in Phase I. Then,
the probability share is σ0(a,b, t) ∗ 0.
(2) 1 neighbor: 3 of its neighbors are not sampled in Phase I.
Then, the probability share is:
σ1(a, b, t ) ∗ [1 − Pr (a, b, t )] ∗ E(θˆN ) + E(θˆS ) + E(θˆW ) + E(θˆE )4 (10)
where all 4 neighbors can be the one used for interpolation.
(3) 2 neighbors: 2 of its neighbors not sampled in Phase I. Then,
the probability share is:
σ2(a, b, t ) ∗ [1 − Pr (a, b, t )] ∗ 3E(θˆN ) + 3E(θˆS ) + 3E(θˆW ) + 3E(θˆE )6 ∗ 2 (11)
where 6 different combinations of two neighbors can be used
for interpolation and the interpolated RGB is the average of
two neighbors’ RGBs.
(4) 3 neighbors: 1 of its neighbors is not sampled in Phase I.
Then, the probability share is:
σ3(a, b, t ) ∗ [1 − Pr (a, b, t )] ∗ 3E(θˆN ) + 3E(θˆS ) + 3E(θˆW ) + 3E(θˆE )4 ∗ 2 (12)
where 4 different combinations of two neighbors can be used
for interpolation and the interpolated RGB is the average of
three neighbors’ RGBs.
(5) 4 neighbors: no neighbor is suppressed in sampling. Then,
the probability share is:
σ4(a, b, t ) ∗ [1 − Pr (a, b, t )] ∗ E(θˆN ) + E(θˆS ) + E(θˆW ) + E(θˆE )4 (13)
where only 1 combination of 4 neighbors can be used for
interpolation and the interpolated RGB is the average of 4
neighbors’ RGBs.
Similarly, if pixel (a,b, t) is on the border but not at the corner
of the t th frame (w.l.o.g., the left border), then we have:
E[θˆ (a, b, t )] = Pr (a, b, t ) ∗ θ (a, b, t ) + σ0(a, b, t ) ∗ 0
+
σ1(a, b, t ) ∗ [1 − Pr (a, b, t )] ∗ [E(θˆN ) + E(θˆS ) + E(θˆE )]
3
+
σ2(a, b, t ) ∗ [1 − Pr (a, b, t )] ∗ [2E(θˆN ) + 2E(θˆS ) + 2E(θˆE )]]
3 ∗ 2
+
σ3(a, b, t ) ∗ [1 − Pr (a, b, t )] ∗ [E(θˆN ) + E(θˆS ) + E(θˆE )]
3 (14)
If pixel (a,b, t) is located at the corner of the t th frame (w.l.o.g.,
the upper-left corner), then we have:
E[θˆ (a, b, t )] = Pr (a, b, t ) ∗ θ (a, b, t ) + σ0(a, b, t ) ∗ 0
+
σ1(a, b, t ) ∗ [1 − Pr (a, b, t )] ∗ [E(θˆS ) + E(θˆE )]
2
+
σ2(a, b, t ) ∗ [1 − Pr (a, b, t )] ∗ [E(θˆS ) + E(θˆE )]]
2 (15)
A.2 Solving Algorithm
The optimal number of distinct RGBs kj (to allocate privacy budget)
is computed based on minimizing the MSE expectation of visual
element ϒj (averaged by the number of pixels). Thus, we solve the
following optimization (which is equivalent to Equation 2):
argmin
kj
∑
∀(a,b,t )∈ϒj
(
E[θ (a,b, t)] − E[θˆ (a,b, t)])2
We now present how to derive the optimal kj (given multi-scale
RGB selection) and the corresponding RGB expectation of all the
pixels in VE ϒj (in all the frames). Per Equation 1 (for non-border
pixels), Equation 14 (for border-but-not-corner pixels) and Equation
15 (for corner pixels), for pixel |ϒj | pixels, we can have |ϒj | equa-
tions for |ϒj | variables, each of which is the RGB expectation of a
pixel. W.l.o.g., assuming that ϒj has A ∗ B pixels in a rectangle with
the coordinates (1, 1), (1, 2), . . . , (1,B), . . . (A, 1), . . . (A,B), thus we
have (frame ID t is skipped for simplicity of notations):

E[θˆ (1, 1)] = Pr (1, 1)) ∗ θ (1, 1) + [1 − Pr (1, 1)]∗
(σ1(1,1)+σ2(1,1))∗(E[θˆ (1,2)]+E[θˆ (2,1)])
2
E[θˆ (1, 2)] = Pr (1, 2) ∗ θ (1, 2) + [1 − Pr (1, 2)]∗
(σ1(1,2)+σ2(1,2)+σ3(1,2))∗(E[θˆ (1,1)]+E[θˆ (2,2)]+E[θˆ (1,3)])
3
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
∀a ∈ (1, A), ∀b ∈ (1, B)
E(θˆ (a, b)) = Pr (a, b) ∗ θ (a, b) + [1 − Pr (a, b)]∗
(σ1(a,b)+···+σ4(a,b))∗(E[θˆ (a−1,b)]+···+E[θˆ (a,b+1)])
4
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
E(θˆ (A, B)) = Pr (A, B) ∗ θ (A, B) + [1 − Pr (A, B)]∗
(σ1(A,B)+σ2(A,B))∗(E[θˆ (A−1,b)]+E[θˆ (A,B−1)]
2
Note that the above equations can be simply extended to all the
pixels in ϒj in all the frames (incorporating the frame ID t ). We use
the inverse matrix to solve these equations where the coefficients
of all the above equations can be represented as a |ϒj | × |ϒj | ma-
trix (denoted as M). To ensure that the inverse matrix can solve
the equations, M should have a full rank |ϒj |. In case that M is
not a full rank matrix (indeed, the rank of M is very high since
∀(a,b, t) ∈ ϒj ,σ1(a,b, t),σ2 (a,b, t),σ3(a,b, t),σ4(a,b, t) are pseu-
dorandom), we can add a tiny random noise to the non-zero entries
inM (in which the deviation is negligible).
Specifically, denoting the expectation of the sth pixel in ϒj as
E[θˆ (s)] where s ∈ [1,AB]. Then, we have
E[θˆ (s)] = 1|M | ∗
AB∑
i=1
[(−1)i+s ∗M (AB−1)is ∗ bi ] (16)
where |M | is the determinant of matrixM ,M(AB−1)is denotes the
sth cofactor (corresponding the sth pixel; including (AB−1)×(AB−1)
entries) and bi is the ith constant in the equation (in last column of
matrixM). Thus,M(AB−1)is can be recursively represented as below:
M (AB−1)is =
AB∑
i=1
[(−1)i+s ∗ Ri ∗M (AB−2)is ] (17)
whereM(AB−2) represents the cofactor matrix ofMAB−1 and Ri
is a random constant (for ensuring full rank forM) which is close
to − [1−Pr (a,b,t )](σ1(a,b,t )+σ2(a,b,t ))2 for corner pixels,
− [1−Pr (a,b,t )][σ1(a,b,t )+σ2(a,b,t )+σ3(a,b,t )]3 for border pixels, and
− [1−Pr (a,b,t )][σ1(a,b,t )+σ2(a,b,t )+σ3(a,b,t )+σ4(a,b,t )]4 for non-border
pixels. As a result, Equation 17 can be represented as:
M (AB−1)is =
AB∑
i=1
[(−1)i+s ∗ (
AB−3∏
i=1
Ri ) ∗M (2)is ] (18)
Since each row of the matrix M only has at most 5 non-zero
entries (corresponding to the variables of the current pixel and its
four/three/two neighbors), we have:
E[θˆ (s)] ≈ − 5
AB−3 ∗ AB
|M | ∗ max∀i∈[1,AB]{ |Ri |
AB−3 ∗M (2)is ∗ bi } (19)
Thus, the MSE expectation in VE ϒj can be directly derived as:
AB∑
i=1
[θ (a,b, t) + 5
AB−3 ∗AB
|M | ∗ max∀i ∈[1,AB]{|Ri |
AB−3 ∗M(2)is ∗ bi }]2
For eachkj , the correspondingMSE expectation can be computed
using the above equation. Then, the optimal kj can be obtained
by traversing kj in any range. In addition, it is straightforward
to prove that the complexity of the inverse matrix based solver is
O(n3 log(n)). Note that we assume that the optimal kj is computed
for minimum MSE based on the first traversal in the interpolation
of each visual element (in Algorithm 2). The deviation is very minor
since most pixels are interpolated in the first traversal in our experi-
ments. Moreover, the optimal kj (derived from the above algorithm)
is also validated in our experiments (see Figure 11(d)).
B BUDGET ALLOCATION ALGORITHM
Algorithm 3: Budget Allocation
Input :n sets of RGBs ∀j ∈ [1, n], Ψj = {i ∈ [1, kj ], θ˜i j }
privacy budget ϵ for Phase I of VideoDP
Output :privacy budget for each unique RGB in n sets
1 initialize the set of unique RGBs: Ψ← ⋃nj=1 Ψj
2 foreach j ∈ [1, n] do
3 initialize the overall budget for set Ψj : ϵ (Ψj ) ← ϵ
4 foreach ℓ ∈ [1, n] do
5 foreach θ˜ ∈ Ψ do
6 if count (θ˜ ∈ {Ψ1, . . . , Ψn }) = (n − ℓ + 1) then
// w.l.o.g., θ˜ ∈ Ψ1, . . . , Ψn−ℓ+1
7 initialize budget for RGB θ˜ : ϵ (θ˜ )
8 ϵ (θ˜ ) ← argmin
∀j∈[1, (n−ℓ+1)]
[dj (θ˜ )
dj
∗ ϵ (Ψj )]
//
dj (θ˜ )
dj
denotes the ratio of pixels with RGB θ˜ in
Ψj
9 foreach j ∈ [1, (n − ℓ + 1)], Ψj do
10 update budget: ϵ (Ψj ) ← ϵ (Ψj ) − ϵ (θ˜ )
11 update total pixel count: dj ← dj − dj (θ˜ )
// ϵ (Ψj ) > ϵ (θ˜ ) for the first (n − 1) partitions;
ϵ (Ψj ) = ϵ (θ˜ ) for the last partition (0 budget
left)
12 return budget ϵ (θ˜ ) for RGB θ˜
13 Ψ← Ψ \ θ˜
C PROBABILISTIC DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
AND INDISTINGUISHABILITY
Proposition C.1. If for any two neighboring inputs V and V ′,
Pr [A(V )=O ]
Pr [A(V ′)=O ] ≤ eϵ hold (where O is an arbitrary output), then
Pr [A(V )∈S ]
Pr [A(V ′)∈S ] ≤ eϵ also holds (where S is an arbitrary set of outputs).
Proof. Since S includes a set of possible outputs, we have:
Pr [A(V ) ∈ S] =
∫
∀O ∈S
Pr [A(V ) = O]dO
≤eϵ
∫
∀O ∈S
Pr [A(V ′) = O]dO = eϵPr [A(V ′) ∈ S]
This completes the proof. Note that the above proof is adapted
from [24, 34]. □
D ADDITIONAL EVALUATIONS
While evaluating the utility of the utility-driven private videos using
two utility measures (KL divergence and MSE), we also fix ϵ and
traverse different k for all the visual elements (assigning the same
k ∈ [4, 30]). Figure 11(a) and 11(b) present the KL divergence values
for all the sampled pixels (where privacy budget ϵ is fixed as 0.8
and 1.6, respectively). We can observe that the KL value increases
as k increases (if the same number of distinct RGBs in all the visual
elements are selected to assign privacy budgets). This is true for
the following reason: smaller k samples pixels with less diverse
RGBs, but it can allocate a larger privacy budget to each RGB. Then,
the generated results can have better count distributions for all the
sampled RGBs.
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Figure 11: Pixel Level Utility Evaluation with k
We also examine the optimal number of selected RGBs to assign
privacy budgets kj in visual elements. We select the visual element
with most pixels in both videos (PED and VEH). Since the optimal
values are derived based on MSEs, we plot the normalized MSEs
for all the pixels in the visual element for two videos in Figure 11(c)
(after Phase I) and Figure 11(d) (after Phase II), respectively. The
normalized MSE does not change much (after Phase I) as k increases
since the MSE expectation is optimized for Phase II. Instead, Figure
11(d) clearly shows that kj goes optimal in the range (which equals
the optimal kj after solving Equation 2 using the algorithm in
Table 2: Frequently Used Notations
VE visual element (e.g., object, human)
V , O orignal video and output synthetic video
|V |, |O | total pixel counts in V , O
m the number of distinct RGBs in V
θi the ith RGB in V where i ∈ [1,m]
n the number of distinct VEs in V
ϒj the jth VE in V (all the frames), j ∈ [1, n]
|ϒj | total number of pixels in |ϒj |
Ψj set of RGBs in ϒj with budgets
|Ψj | cardinality of Ψj
dj total pixel count in ϒj
θ˜i j the ith RGB in Ψj
kj (optimal) number of distinct RGBs in ϒj
Ψ, |Ψ | ⋃nj=1 Ψj , cardinality of Ψ
θ˜i , θi the ith RGB in Ψ, the ith RGB in V
c˜i (or ci ), c˜ ji total pixel count for RGB θ˜i (or θi ) in V , ϒj
x˜i (or xi ) total pixel count for RGB θ˜i (or θi ) in O
(a, b, t ) the pixel with coordinates (a, b) and frame t
θ (a, b, t ) the RGB of pixel (a, b, t ) in V
θˆ (a, b, t ) the RGB of pixel (a, b, t ) in O
Pr (a, b, t ) probability that pixel (a, b, t ) is sampled
σ0, . . . , σ4 probabilities that pixel (a, b, t ) has 0, 1, . . . , 4
neighboring pixels after Phase I (sampling)
θˆN simplified notation for θˆ (a − 1, b, t )
θˆS simplified notation for θˆ (a + 1, b, t )
θˆW simplified notation for θˆ (a, b − 1, t )
θˆE simplified notation for θˆ (a, b + 1, t )
Appendix A) in both videos for all possible values in the specified
range. As kj increases, the normalized MSE of the VE first decreases
and then increases. This reflects that the best kj is neither too small
nor too large in each VE.
Finally, we present some representative frames of the VEH video
to show the effectiveness of pixel sampling (Phase I) and utility-
driven private video generation (Phase II) in VideoDP. Figure 12(a)
and 12(b) demonstrate that more pixels are sampled as private
budget ϵ is larger. The same frames (missing pixels are interpolated)
after Phase II are shown in Figure 12(c) and 12(d), respectively. We
can observe that the vehicles are randomly generated in the frame
of the utility-driven private video (which are not directly revealed
to the analysts). Then, disclosing the any query/analysis result
derived from such (random) video to untrusted analysts satisfies
differential privacy.
(a) ϵ = 0.8 (after Phase I) (b) ϵ = 1.6 (after Phase I)
(c) ϵ = 0.8 (after Phase II) (d) ϵ = 1.6 (after Phase II)
Figure 12: Representative Frames of VideoDP on Video VEH
E THE NOTATION TABLE
